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Unaccounted for currency in the U.S. is argued to reflect the presence of widespread 
income tax evasion. This empirical study seeks to identify determinants of the 
underground economy in the U.S. in the form of federal personal income tax evasion 
over the period 1970-2008. In this study, we use the most recent data available on 
personal income tax evasion, data that are derived from the General Currency Ratio 
Model and measured in the form of the ratio of unreported AGI (adjusted gross income) 
to reported AGI. Other studies of federal income tax evasion for the U.S. are dated and 
do not use data this current. It is found that personal income tax evasion was an 
increasing function of the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate, the 
percentage of federal personal income tax returns characterized by itemized deductions, 
and unpopular military engagements, in this case, the War in Iraq, and a decreasing 
function of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (during its first two years of being 
implemented), the ratio of the tax free interest rate yield on high grade municipals to the 
interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes (as a measure of the incentive effect of a 
better return to tax avoidance, which is legal), and higher audit rates of filed federal 
income tax returns (as a measure of risk from tax evasion) by IRS personnel.  
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1 Introduction 
U.S. households and firms admit to holding only about 15% of the total known stock of U.S. 
currency outside the banking system (Cebula, 2011). It is suspected that much of this 
disparity between the actual size of the stock of currency in the U.S. and the accounted for 
(admitted to) holdings of U.S. currency is attributable to the currency’s being used in 
transactions that are not reported to the IRS (Feige, 2009). In other words, unaccounted for 
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currency in the U.S. is argued to reflect the presence of the so-called “underground economy” 
in the form of widespread personal income tax evasion.  
Income tax evasion effectively consists of taxable income that is either unreported or 
underreported to the IRS; it also can consist of spurious, fabricated, or exaggerated tax 
deductions. Studies of income tax evasion behavior essentially fall into three categories. First, 
there are the principally theoretical models of tax evasion behavior, such as Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972), Falkinger (1988), Klepper, Nagin, and Spurr (1991), Das-Gupta (1994), 
Pestieau, Possen, and Slutsky (1994), Caballe and Panades (1997). As a rule, most such 
studies are not empirical in nature. Second, there are a number of studies that either (a) use 
questionnaires or (b) undertake experiments, such as Spicer and Lundstedt (1976), Spicer and 
Thomas (1982), Baldry (1987), Alm, Jackson, and McGee (1992), Thurman (1991), and Alm, 
McClelland, and Schulze (1999). These studies are empirical in nature, deriving the data 
largely (if not entirely) from the experiments. Certain of these studies indicate an aversion to 
the prospect of being audited while others reveal a lack of such risk-averse behavior; still 
others imply that taxpayers may be averse to tax evasion on moral grounds. Additionally, the 
incentive to evade taxation by underreporting income provided by higher marginal income tax 
rates is also revealed in several of these studies. Third, there are those studies that largely or 
in some cases exclusively adopt what is referred to as "official data,” i.e., data obtained from 
the IRS (or its counterpart outside of the U.S.) and/or some other “official source,” i.e., a 
government agency. Among, the types of information thusly obtained and analyzed are data 
on income tax evasion, income tax rates, and audit rates. Such studies endeavor typically 
either seek to estimate the aggregate degree of tax evasion or to identify the determinants 
thereof (Tanzi, 1982, 1983; Clotfelter, 1983; Carson, 1984; Pyle, 1989; Erard and Feinstein, 
1994; Feige, 1994, 1989, 1996; Cebula, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2011; Ali, Cecil, and 
Knoblett, 2001; Ledbetter, 2004; Alm and Yunus, 2009; Cebula and Coombs, 2009; Cebula, 
Coombs, and Yang, 2009).    
In this literature, it is widely believed that the degree of federal personal income tax 
evasion in the economy as a whole is positively affected by income tax rates (Tanzi, 1982; 
Clotfelter, 1983; Feige, 1994). Interestingly, Yaniv (1994) characterizes Clotfelter (1983) as 
“the most relevant study” with respect to the impact of income tax rates on tax evasion, 
whereas Cox (1984) questions his findings. In any event, this perspective is simple: the higher 
the income tax rate, the greater the benefit (in terms of a reduced tax liability) from not 
reporting taxable income, ceteris paribus. It is also widely accepted that the greater the risk 
associated with underreporting or not reporting taxable income, the less the degree to which 
economic agents will choose either to not report or to underreport their taxable income 
(Friedland, 1982; Spicer and Thomas, 1985; De Juan, 1989; Errard and Feinstein, 1994; 
Cebula and Coombs, 2009). 
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This study seeks to add to the rich literature on income tax evasion by identifying key 
determinants of federal personal income tax evasion using data up to and including the year 
2008. With the exception of a single study, the most recent year of tax evasion behavior in the 
U.S. that has been formally studied is 2005 (Cebula, 2011); for the most part, earlier studies 
of the U.S. do not go beyond the year 1997. Thus, by investigating tax evasion through 2008, 
the study period is more current than the existing published literature. The framework/model 
is presented in Section II. Section III provides the formal empirical analysis, whereas Section 
IV provides a summary of the study findings and certain policy observations.   
2  A Benefit-Cost Model of Under-Reporting Taxable Income 
In this study, the relative probability that the representative economic agent will under-report 
his/her taxable income to the IRS (pur) is treated as an increasing function of the expected 
gross benefits to the agent of under-reporting taxable income, egb, and as a decreasing 
function of the expected gross costs to the agent of under-reporting taxable income, egc. 
Thus, the ratio of the probability of under-reporting taxable income to the IRS, pur, to the 
probability of fully reporting taxable income 1  to the IRS, (1-pur), is described for the 
representative economic agent by: 
pur/(1-pur) = f(egb, egc), such that fegb > 0, fegc < 0   (1) 
Expressing the probabilities described in equation (1) in relative terms possesses the virtue 
that it thereby reflects the form of the tax evasion data, i.e., data where (as described below in 
Section III) the aggregate degree of federal personal income tax evasion is expressed in such 
relative terms. 
2.1  The Expected Gross Benefits of Under-Reporting Taxable Income 
The expected benefits of income tax evasion arguably can assume two different forms: 
expected direct benefits and expected secondary benefits. Expected primary or direct benefits 
of income tax evasion can be regarded as obvious or transparent. Expected secondary benefits 
are less tangible but can nonetheless be very real. 
2.1a Expected Direct Benefits of Under-Reporting Taxable Income 
The best example of direct benefits from income tax evasion would be the value of the taxes 
not paid to the IRS. To the extent that an individual engages in income tax evasion and 
underpays income taxes by, say, $X, those $X are a direct benefit to the individual, who can 
(in theory) spend and/or save the $X. It follows that the higher the marginal federal income 
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tax rate that the individual is subject to, the greater the pecuniary direct benefit from 
underreporting his or her income and/or from exaggerating tax deductions by any given 
amount. For instance, if the maximum marginal income tax rate is 10 percent, tax evasion in 
the amount of $5000 would be expected to directly yield the tax evader $500; however, if the 
individual faced a 40 percent income tax rate, the expected direct benefit of this degree of tax 
evasion would be $2,000. Thus, it is logical to deduce that, ceteris paribus, the higher the 
maximum marginal income tax rate faced by a taxpayer, the greater the incentive to engage in 
income tax evasion because the higher that income tax rate, the greater the expected benefits 
of the tax evasion behavior.  
 It is standard in the tax evasion literature to hypothesize that the gross expected direct 
benefits from not reporting income to the IRS are an increasing function of the federal 
personal income tax rate (Tanzi, 1982; Clotfelter, 1983; Feige, 1994). To reflect the federal 
personal income tax rate, this study adopts the maximum marginal federal personal income 
tax rate (MAXMARGTX). This measure of the income tax rate is adopted because it can be 
argued that it not only is an actual income tax rate but also reflects to some degree the extent 
to which the income tax rate schedule at any point in time is progressive. 
In the U.S., Form A of Schedule 1040 provides a variety of itemized deductions types that 
enable the taxpayer ultimately to directly reduce his/her taxable income. These include 
allowances for medical expenses, state and local government taxes, mortgage interest 
payments, charitable contributions, and other such outlays. The larger the pecuniary value of 
these deductions, the lower the taxable income of the taxpayer. Furthermore, given the rather 
varied, numerous, and sometimes complex forms of these deductions, and given the limited 
ability for the IRS to verify many of these itemized deductions, taxpayers filing their tax 
returns and claiming itemized deductions have an opportunity to derive direct tax benefits by 
overstating their itemized deductions. Thus, it is hypothesized that the greater the proportion 
of taxpayers who itemize their tax deductions (PCTITEM),2 the greater the degree to which 
itemized deductions are exaggerated and hence the greater the direct expected benefits of 
federal personal income tax evasion/under-reporting taxable income. Interestingly, this 
variable, which reduces taxable income, has been effectively ignored in the official tax 
evasion literature to date. 
Whereas higher income tax rates and the opportunity to claim exaggerated itemized 
deductions can yield expected direct tangible benefits from income tax evasion, there is at 
least one course of action that can tangibly reduce the expected direct benefits of income tax 
evasion. Moreover, it is a legal course of action, namely, it is legal tax avoidance. One avenue 
through which this course of action is made possible in the U.S. is the existence of the 
municipal bond market, where qualified bonds issued by cities, counties, and states in the 
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U.S. pay interest that is free from federal income taxation to the owners of record of such 
bonds.3 In particular, following Cebula (2004), it can be argued that the greater the ratio of tax 
free interest rate yield on high grade municipals relative to taxable interest rate yield such as 
that on 10-year U.S. Treasury notes, TFTEN, the greater the benefits of tax avoidance, which 
is legal, and hence the less the expected direct benefits of tax evasion, which of course is 
illegal.    
2.1 b     Expected Secondary Benefits of Under-Reporting Taxable Income 
Aside from the issues of tax rates and itemization of deductions, persons who have taxable 
income may be able in certain cases to derive secondary benefits from income tax evasion 
behavior, i.e., from under-reporting taxable income. For example, if people disapprove of the 
way in which the federal government is spending their tax dollars, they may be angered or 
frustrated. To relieve this anger and/or frustration, they may consider income tax evasion as a 
means of expressing this anger and/or frustration (Feige, 1994).  
Consider the case of the U.S. military being engaged in an unpopular war. For example, 
there is empirical evidence (Cebula, 2001) that the unpopularity of the Vietnam War so 
angered the public that many chose to underreport their income and/or exaggerate their 
itemized tax deductions. This form of income tax evasion behavior was undertaken because 
of the disapproval by much of the U.S. public of the U.S. involvement in and expenditures to 
finance the Vietnam War using their tax dollars. As the Vietnam War raged on, at least some 
portion of the public received secondary benefits/gains from the experience that they were 
withholding financing of that military action. Similarly, it is hypothesized in the present study 
that the U.S. military involvement in Iraq, i.e., the War in Iraq (IRAQWAR), that began in 
2003 and was still raging on through and beyond the end of the study period for the present 
study was very unpopular with the U.S. populace as a whole. Indeed, Cebula, Cook, and Issa 
(2007), found strong empirical evidence that the War in Iraq was very unpopular with a large 
percentage of the U.S. population. Hence, the War in Iraq is hypothesized here to have 
created a circumstance for people to express their dis-satisfaction by engaging in a greater 
degree of income tax evasion that yielded them a secondary gain from such. 
Thus, the expected gross direct and secondary benefits from income tax evasion are 
expressed as: 
 egb =  egb (MAXMARGTX, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR)  (2) 
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2.1c    Expected Gross Costs of Under-Reporting Taxable Income 
The expected gross costs of not reporting or under-reporting taxable income to the IRS and/or 
of reporting exaggerated itemized deductions to the IRS are hypothesized to be an increasing 
function of the expected risks/costs thereof (Pestieau, Possen and Slutsky, 1994; Erard and 
Feinstein, 1994; Caballe and Panades, 1997). In this study, to the representative economic 
agent, the expected risks/costs from from underreporting taxable income to the IRS are 
enhanced by an increase in AUDIT, the percentage of filed federal personal income tax 
returns that is formally audited by IRS examiners/personnel, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the 
experience of an IRS tax audit could imply non-pecuniary ("psychic") costs (such as 
psychological stress) as well as direct pecuniary costs (including outlays for attorneys and/or 
other representation such as accountants or financial advisors, along with the value of one's 
own time) above and beyond any potential added taxes, penalties, and interest assessed by the 
IRS. Hence, this study adopts the probability of a formal audit as a measure of risk to the 
would-be tax evader.4  
Hence, the expected gross costs of engaging in income tax evasion is represented in this 
study by: 
 egc = egc (AUDIT)    (3) 
2.1d     A Control Variable: The Tax Reform Act of 1986  
 
In 1987, Musgrave observed (1987, p. 59), “The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is the most 
sweeping reform since the early 1940s…” Indeed, the TRA [Tax Reform Act] did introduce a 
number of reforms, many of which are outlined in broad terms in Barth (1991), Barth and 
Brumbaugh (1992), Ott and Vegari (2003), and Sanger, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1990). For 
example, as observed in Ott and Vegari (2003, p. 279), “The Act introduced major cuts in the 
personal tax rate. When fully effective (1988), only two tax brackets set at 15 and 28 percent, 
were to replace the 14 bracket tax schedule with rates in the range of 11 to 50 percent...[while 
it] broadened the tax base by reducing the itemized deduction.” Furthermore, as Barth (1991, 
pp. 45, 124) observes, among other things, under the TRA the 10 percent investment tax credit 
for the purchase of equipment was repealed, and the “life” of the investment was increased 
for depreciation purposes. Thus, it is hypothesized here that at the time the TRA was being 
enacted and being fully implemented (1986-1987), there were many complex and new 
                                                 
4 Ideally, IRS penalty assessments could also be adopted as a measure of the risk associated with tax 
evasion; unfortunately, a dependable and complete set of penalty data is not available for all the years 
in the study period. 
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provisions added to the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. Consequently, taxpayers in general, 
including would–be tax evaders, were unfamiliar with the sweeping changes in IRS policies. 
It logically follows that not only honest taxpayers but also those contemplating income tax 
evasion required time to climb the “learning curve” associated with the TRA, resulting in at 
least some temporary tempering of the aggregate degree of federal personal income tax 
evasion. The temporary decline is attributable to the fact that it would likely take at least some 
time for taxpayers to adequately understand and make adjustments to the newly revised 
Internal Revenue Code. Consequently, it is hypothesized here that, for the period when the 
TRA was initially implemented, 1986, through the year the TRA became “de facto fully 
effective,” 1987 (Barth, 1991; Barth and Brumbaugh, 1992), the value of egb was reduced. 
Accordingly, (2) above is replaced by (4): 
egb =  egb (MAXMARGTX, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR, TRA)  (4) 
2.1e The Synthesized Model  
To express the full model, simply requires substituting from equations (3) and (4) into 
equation (1) yielding:  
pur/(1-pur) = f(MAXMARGTX, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR, TRA, AUDIT) (5) 
Let AGI represent the actual total value of the aggregate federal adjusted gross income in the 
economy, i.e., AGI=UAGI+RAGI, where UAGI is the dollar size of the unreported aggregate 
federal adjusted gross income in the economy,5 and RAGI is the dollar size of the reported 
aggregate federal adjusted gross income in the economy. It logically follows that the relative 
degree of aggregate income tax evasion can be given by: (pur)/(1-pur) = UAGI/RAGI. Thus, 
it follows that equation (5) can be replaced by equation (6): 
UAGI/RAGI = f (MAXMARGTX, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR, TRA, AUDIT) (6) 
Equation (6) constitutes the foundation for the empirical model considered in the next Section 
of this study.6 For the convenience of the reader, Table 1 summarizes the expected impact of 
each of these explanatory variable on income tax evasion. 
 
                                                 
5 For an explanation of how unreported adjusted gross income is calculated using the General Currency 
Ratio model, see Feige (2009). 
6 Clearly, UAGI = (pur)*AGI and RAGI = (1-pur)*AGI. It then follows that:  
   UAGI/RAGI = (pur)*AGI/(1-pur)*AGI = (pur)/(1-pur). Substitution of UAGI/RAGI for pur/(1-pur) in (5) 
yields: UAGI/RAGI = f (MAXMARGTX, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR, TRA, AUDIT), which is 
equation (6).  
CEBULA   Underground Economy and Tax Evasion 
 
 43
Table 1. Expected Impacts of Variables on Aggregate Personal Income Tax Evasion 
 
Variable Expected Impact on Aggregate Personal 
  Income Tax Evasion (+ or -) 
MAXMARGTX   + 
PCTITEM   + 
TFTEN     - 
IRAQWAR    + 
TRA     - 
AUDIT    - 
 
3   Empirical Analysis 
3.1    The Basic Reduced-Form Empirical Model   
Based on the framework provided in equation (6) above, the following 
reduced-form equation is to be estimated initially: 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)t = a0 + a1 MAXMARGTXt-1 + a2 PCTITEMt-1 + a3 TFTENt-1    
                + a4 IRAQWARt + a5 TRAt + a6 AUDITt-1 + u        (7) 
 
where:  
 
(UAGI/RAGI)t = the ratio of the aggregate unreported federal adjusted gross income in year t 
to the aggregate reported federal adjusted gross income in year t, expressed as a percent; 
a0 = constant term; 
MAXMARGTXt-1 = the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate in year t-1, 
expressed as a percent; 
PCTITEMt-1 = the percentage of federal personal income tax returns that included Schedule A, 
itemizing deductions, in year t-1; 
TFTENt-1 = the ratio of the average interest rate yield on high grade tax free municipal bonds 
in year t-1 to the average interest rate yield on 10-year Treasury notes in year t-1, 
expressed as a percentage; 
IRAQWARt = a binary (dummy) variable for the 2003 through 2008, during which the U.S. 
was involved in the war in Iraq; IRAQWARt = 1 for the year 2003 through 2008 and 
IRAQWARt = 0 otherwise;  
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TRAt = a binary (dummy) variable for the years 1986 and 1987: TRAt =1 for the years 1986, 
1987 and TRAt =0 otherwise; 
AUDITt-1 = the percentage of filed federal personal income tax returns in year t-1 that was 
subjected to a formal IRS audit involving IRS examiners; and 
u = stochastic error term.  
 
The study period runs from 1970 through 2008, reflecting availability of the data used in 
the analysis. The data are annual. For the interested reader, descriptive statistics for the study 
period for each of the variables are found in Table 2. Finally, a group unit root test (which 
assumes a common unit root process) reveals that the variables in the model are stationary in 
levels over the study period.7 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation                 
Period: 1970-2008: 
(UAGI/RAGI)   21.013            2.027 
MAXMARGTX  48.157          15.73 
TRA   0.0513            0.224  
PCTITEM  31.863           3.692 
TFTEN   89.9          10.8 
AUDIT   1.362            0.4 
IRAQWAR  0.154            0.366 
 
The series adopted to measure income tax evasion, in this case represented by the variable 
(UAGI/RAGI), were obtained from Cebula and Feige (2012). Based on the General Currency 
Ratio model, Cebula and Feige (2012) provide estimates of the ratio of aggregate unreported 
adjusted gross income to aggregate reported adjusted gross income, using a 1973 IRS 
estimate for this ratio as the baseline in his computations. These data are provided in Table 3. 
The data for MAXMARGTX were obtained from the Internal Revenue Service (2010, Table 6). 
The AUDIT and PCTITEM data were obtained from the Government Accounting Office 
(1996: Table I.1) and the U.S. Census Bureau (1994, Table 519; 1998, Table 550; 1999, Table 
556; 2001, Table 546; 2010, Table 469). The data for the variable TFTEN were obtained from 
the Council of Economic Advisors (2010, Table B-73). The TRA and IRAQWAR variables 
are binary (dummy) variables; the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was actually signed into law by 
President Reagan in October of 1986.  
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Table 3. Data for Dependent Variable, UAGI/RAGI, by Year, 1960-2008 
 
Year UAGI/RA
GI 
Year UAGI/RAG
I 
Year UAGI/
RAGI 
1960 16.10 1977 20.37 1994 17.98 
1961 15.47 1978 20.63 1995 20.01 
1962 15.86 1979 21.14 1996 18.64 
1963 16.44 1980 22.84 1997 18.66 
1964 15.88 1981 22.25 1998 18.30 
1965 14.62 1982 22.93 1999 20.55 
1966 14.86 1983 21.46 2000 22.29 
1967 15.36 1984 21.86 2001 22.73 
1968 15.21 1985 21.11 2002 23.94 
1969 15.32 1986 18.89 2003 23.17 
1970 16.30 1987 17.42 2004 21.57 
1971 16.04 1988 18.74 2005 21.98 
1972 16.16 1989 21.06 2006 23.85 
1973 16.27 1990 21.06 2007 24.90 
1974 17.47 1991 21.39 2008 23.94 
1975 18.81 1992 19.04  
1976 20.17 1993 17.70  
 
Note: UAGI/RAGI is expressed as a percentage. Source: Cebula and Feige (2012, 
Table B-2, p.282). 
3.2    The Estimation Results 
In the linear estimation of equation (7) in column (a) of Table 4, all six of the estimated 
coefficients exhibit the expected signs. Furthermore, five of these estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, and the remaining one is statistically significant at the 
5% level. The coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.70, so that the model explains 
approximately  seven-tenths of the variation in the independent variable. Based on the DW 
and Rho statistics, there is no concern regarding autocorrelation. Finally, the F-statistic is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, attesting to the overall strength of the model. 
According to the results provided column (a) of Table 4, the coefficient on the maximum 
marginal federal personal income tax rate variable (MAXMARGTX) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, as expected, the higher the maximum marginal 
federal personal income tax rate, the greater the expected benefits of tax evasion and hence 
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the greater the extent of that income tax evasion. This finding is consistent with most previous 
studies of income tax evasion using official data (Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett, 2001; Cebula, 
2001, 2004; Clotfelter, 1983; Feige, 1994; Klepper, Nagin, and Spurr, 1991; Tanzi, 1982, 
1983).  
 
Table 4. Empirical Estimates, 1970-2008 
 
Variable (UAGI/RAGI) log (UAGI/RAGI) log (UAGI/RAGI) 
Specification (a) OLS (Linear) (b) OLS (Semi-log) (c) OLS (Log-Log) 
a0 24.85 3.22 1.36 
MAXMARGTX 0.088*** 0.0043*** 0.106* 
 (-2.89) (-2.9) (-2.11) 
PCTITEM 0.189* 0.009* 0.356** 
 (-2.13) (-2.07) (-2.07) 
TFTEN -10.97*** -0.521*** -0.594*** 
 (-2.83) (-2.79) (-3.56) 
TRA -4.497*** -0.222*** -0.206*** 
 (-3.88) (-3.92) (-3.87) 
IRAQWAR 2.652*** 0.124*** 0.118*** 
 (-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.07) 
AUDIT -3.358*** -0.1604*** -0.171*** 
 (-3.18) (-3.11) (-3.46) 
   
R2 0.7 0.69 0.72 
AdjR2 0.63 0.62 0.65 
F 9.76*** 9.41*** 10.47*** 
DW 1.77 1.74 1.89 
Rho 0.11 0.1 0.05 
 
Notes: Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***indicates statistical significance at the one percent 
level; **indicates statistical significance at the 2.5 percent level; *indicates statistical significance 
at the five percent level. 
 
The estimated coefficient on the PCTITEM variable is positive and statistically significant 
at beyond the 5% level. This finding implies that the greater the percentage of taxpayers that 
itemizes their personal deductions (on Schedule A of Form 1040), the greater the degree to 
which taxable income is under-reported and hence the greater the degree of aggregate federal 
personal income tax evasion. This finding has not been researched in the literature to date.  
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The estimated coefficient on the tax free/taxable interest rate variable, TFTEN, is negative, 
as hypothesized, and statistically significant at the 1% level, providing compelling empirical 
evidence that the greater the rewards for legal tax avoidance (as measured here), the less the 
aggregate degree of illegal personal income tax evasion. This finding is consistent with 
Cebula (2004), who first proposed and tested this hypothesis, albeit with data running only 
through the year 1997.  
Consistent with the arguments in Musgrave (1987) and findings in Cebula, Coombs and 
Yang (2009), the results for TRA variable are compelling. In particular, the estimated 
coefficient on variable TRA is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, 
there is evidence that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is shown to have reduced federal personal 
income tax evasion in the U.S., albeit only briefly. Given the specification of TRA as 
applying to the short-term period of just 1986 and 1987, these results would seem to confirm 
the prior findings by Cebula, Coombs and Yang (2009), who argue that it would take at least 
some time for taxpayers to understand the revisions in the Internal Revenue Code and to 
adjust to those revisions.  
The estimated coefficient on the binary IRAQWAR variable is positive, as hypothesized, 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, it appears that taxpayers in the aggregate 
engage in increased federal personal income tax evasion when the U.S. is involved in an 
unpopular war. In principle, this finding is compatible with the empirical evidence in Cebula 
(2001), who found that the unpopularity of the Vietnam War so angered the U.S. public that 
many chose to underreport their income and/or exaggerate their tax deductions. It also is 
consistent with Cebula, Cook, and Issa (2007), who found strong empirical evidence that the 
War in Iraq was very unpopular with a large percentage of the U.S. population.  
Finally, there is the audit rate (by IRS examiners) variable. As shown in the first column 
of Table 4, the estimated coefficient on this variable is negative and statistically significant at 
1% level. Thus, it appears that the audit rate variable (AUDIT), of and in itself, may be 
viewed as an effective deterrent to federal personal income taxation. This finding is consistent 
with previous  studies such as Pestieau, Possen and Slutsky (1994), Erard and Feinstein 
(1994), Caballe and Panades (1997), and Cebula (2001), who suggests that IRS policies such 
as a higher audit rate by IRS personnel impose a variety of costs, both pecuniary and psychic, 
that act to dissuade income tax evasion behavior.  
To test the consistency of the model and provide further insights into the issues at hand, 
the basic model in equation (7) was estimated next in semi-log form and then in log-log form. 
These empirical results can be found, respectively, in columns (b) and (c) of Table 4. Overall, 
all 12 of the estimated coefficients in columns (b) and (c) exhibit the expected signs and are 
statistically significant at the 5% level, and in most case, at beyond the 5% level. The F-
statistics in both estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level, and the R2 values in 
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both cases falls in the range of 0.70, thusly explain about seven-tenths of the variation in the 
dependent variable.  
In column (b) of Table 4, all six of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs, 
with five being statistically significant at the 1% level and one being statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Thus, in this semi-log estimation for the 1970-2008 study period, the 
underground economy in the form of income tax evasion in the U.S. was, paralleling the 
estimate in column (a), an increasing function of the maximum marginal federal income tax 
rate (at the 1% statistical significance level), the percentage of tax filers that itemized personal 
deductions (at the 5% statistical significance level), and the U.S. involvement in the War in 
Iraq (at the 1% statistical significance level). In addition, income tax evasion was, also 
paralleling the results in column (a), a decreasing function of the ratio of the tax-free interest 
rate yield on high grade municipal bonds to the taxable interest rate yield on 10-year U.S. 
treasury notes (at the 1% statistical significance level), the IRS audit rate by IRS examiners 
(at the 1% statistical significance level), and the Tax Reform Act (at the 1% statistical 
significance level). Thus, the semi-log estimate provides consistent support for the initial 
regression results and conclusions. 
Finally, there is the log-log estimate presented in column (c) of Table 4. In this estimate, 
each of the estimation results associated with an explanatory variable is an elasticity rather 
than a coefficient per se. In column (c), each of the six of the estimated elasticity values 
exhibits the expected sign. In addition, four of the estimated elasticity values are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, one elasticity is statistically significant at the 2.5% level, and the 
remaining one is statistically significant at the 5% level. All of these findings parallel those in 
the linear and semi-log estimates found in columns (a) and (d) of Table 4.  
According to the findings shown in column (c) of Table 4, a 10% increase in the 
maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate would increase aggregate income tax 
evasion in the U.S. by 1.06%. Clearly, then, if this tax rate were increased, the actual tax 
revenue increase would be lower than forecast/expected. Next, a 10% increase in the 
percentage of tax returns filing with itemized deductions would raise personal federal income 
tax evasion by 3.56%. Clearly, the policy of allowing itemized deductions as currently 
practiced may warrant re-examination by the IRS and by policy-makers. On the other hand, if 
the TF/TEN ratio rises by 10%, there would be a 5.94% reduction in personal federal income 
tax evasion, implying that better incentives to avoid federal personal income taxation help to 
avert federal personal income tax evasion. The result for the tax reform variable implies that 
making a major change in the Internal Revenue Code may create challenges for would-be tax 
evaders that result in diminished tax evasion, albeit temporarily. Clearly, involvement in an 
unpopular war, such as the War in Iraq, acts to elevate income tax evasion, apparently by 
about 11.8%, implying that that taxpayers experience a secondary gain from tax evasion when 
U.S. political leaders immerse the military in conflicts the U.S. public disapproves of (Feige, 
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1994; Cebula, 2011). Finally, there is the issue of IRS audits conducted by IRS examiners.8  
The results in this log-log estimate imply that a 10% increase in this audit rate would reduce 
aggregate federal personal income tax evasion by 1.71%; thus, a more aggressive audit policy 
by the IRS could bear fruit in terms of added revenues, although the political unpopularity of 
such a policy mat restrict its implementation.  
4   Summary and Closing Observations 
This empirical study of the underground economy examines a new and updated series based 
on the General Currency Ratio (GCR) Model on personal income tax evasion for the period 
1970 through 2008, with 2008 being the most recent year for which income tax evasion data 
are available for the U.S. The IRS has data based on the AGI-gap approach; however, the 
most recent year for its data is 2005 (Internal Revenue Service, 2010, Table 6).9 Thus, the 
present study is more “contemporary” than previous studies using “official data.” 
 Adopting a cost-benefit model of income tax evasion decision-making, this study 
seeks to identify key determinants of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion (under-
reporting of taxable income, including the exaggerating of itemized deductions, which 
reduces taxable income) in the U.S. over the study period. The principal conclusions are the 
following: federal personal income tax evasion is an increasing function of the maximum 
marginal federal personal income tax rate, the percentage of federal personal income tax 
returns that itemizes deductions, and U.S. involvement in the unpopular war, in this case, the 
War in Iraq. The study also finds that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 acted to briefly discourage 
tax evasion, whereas a higher IRS audit rate by IRS personnel acted to discourage tax 
evasion. Furthermore, the greater the benefits of legal tax avoidance, as measured by the ratio 
of the tax free interest rate yield on high grade municipals to the taxable interest rate yield on 
10-year Treasury notes, the less the degree of illegal tax evasion.  
The findings imply, among other things, that increasing the maximum marginal federal 
personal income tax rate may not be the most efficient means of attempting to raise tax 
revenues. Furthermore, in the pursuit of greater tax revenues, limiting the ability to itemize 
personal tax deductions may be a fruitful path to consider; indeed, it was a significant 
component of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. However, it is a path requiring careful planning 
so as to avoid political fall-out with the taxpaying public. Obviously, avoidance of what is 
likely to be an unpopular war would be wise not only on moral, ethical, and political grounds, 
but also on the practical grounds of avoiding tax revenue losses. Finally, although increasing 
the IRS examiner audit rate may yield tax revenues, political pragmatism would seem to 
require a conservative implementation of such a policy change.  
                                                 
8 As opposed to audits performed by IRS computers.  
9 Cebula (2011) investigates tax evasion determinants through 2005 using this IRS data-set. 
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In closing, it is observed that subsequent related research might seek to identify additional 
factors potentially influencing income tax evasion in the U.S., such as the minimum marginal 
federal personal income tax rate and the presence of undocumented immigrants within U.S. 
borders. In addition, future research might undertake an investigation of the possibility of 
simultaneity issues between tax evasion and other variables (Cebula, 2001; Alm and Yunus, 
2009). 
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